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ARTICLE

“THE SPECIAL FAVORITE OF THE LAWS”?
BLACK LIVES MATTER MOMENTS IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
LEGAL HISTORY
DR. YOHURU WILLIAMS*
The law no longer knows white nor black, but simply men, and
consequently, we are entitled to ride in public conveyances, hold
office, sit on juries, and do everything else which we have in the
past been prevented from doing solely on the ground of color.1
(Delegate to a convention of Alabama freedmen, 1867)
On May 25, 2020, Minneapolis Police Officer Derek Chauvin killed
George Floyd in a wanton act of police brutality by kneeling on his neck for
more than nine minutes. In the immediate aftermath of the murder, widespread protests against police brutality erupted in Minneapolis and across
the nation. At Floyd’s memorial service on June 4, civil rights activist and
Reverend Al Sharpton placed the killing in a broader context: “George
Floyd’s story has been the story of Black Folk in America.”2 Using Derek
Chauvin’s knee as a metaphor, Sharpton talked about the myriad ways in
which white supremacy imposed and continues to impose economic, social,
and political inequality on people of African descent in the United States.
Sharpton concluded his remarks with an appeal for Americans to finally deal with the issue of accountability in policing, systemic prejudice,
and racial injustice. He pointed to the need for what I call “historical recov* This essay is derived in part from Professor Williams’s keynote at the UST Law Journal
Symposium: Protest and Reform, October 23, 2020.
1. L.S. Berry, W.M.V. Turner & R.D. Wiggins, Address of the Colored Convention to the
People of Alabama, Montgomery Daily State Sentinel, May 21, 1867, at 2.
2. For the complete text of Al Sharpton’s speech, see Al Sharpton, Reverend, Eulogy for
George Floyd’s Memorial Service (June 4, 2020) (transcript available at www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/reverend-al-sharpton-eulogy-transcript-at-george-floyd-memorial-service). For audio and
text, see Gabriela Saldivia, I Can Breathe Now: After Days of Nationwide Protests, George Floyd
is Eulogized, NPR (June 4, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/04/869721514/hundreds-ex
pected-at-memorial-for-george-floyd-after-days-of-nationwide-protests.
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ery.” This process of learning United States history through the lens of African Americans enables us to better understand the intentional policies,
practices, and procedures that form the basis of contemporary challenges
regarding race, law, and public policy. It also lays the groundwork for understanding the urgency of passing legislation entitled The George Floyd
Justice in Policing Act.
This process of historical recovery is essential. All too often when confronted with examples of racial prejudice with roots in historical injustices,
many Americans look to fix the blame on individual choices rather than
identifiable policies, practices, and procedures that continue to exert enormous influence on law and society. Without the foundational historical
knowledge necessary to comprehend the connection among these issues,
most discussions on how to eliminate systemic racism eventually degenerate into a form of victim blaming. A good example can be found in the
ongoing debate and discussion over the destruction of the Rondo community in St. Paul. In 1956, the predominantly Black neighborhood was literally bisected to accommodate the construction of the I-94 freeway. Some
600 families were displaced, not to mention a large number of businesses
shuttered.3 This was not an isolated incident confined to St. Paul. In Minneapolis, the construction of Interstate 35W in 1959 also resulted in the destruction of one of the few city neighborhoods where Black people could
rent and own homes unencumbered by racially restrictive covenants.4 The
impact of these deliberate choices on the part of lawmakers and urban planners continues to echo in our contemporary moment. The 2020 Census
shows that while only about 25 percent of Black people own homes in the
Twin Cities, white homeownership stands at 76 percent. This disparity encapsulates the legacy, in many ways, of state and federal laws and discriminatory practices. The income gap provides further evidence; the median

3. On the history of Rondo start with: Alisha Volante, The Rondo Neighborhood & African
American History in St. Paul, MN: 1900s to Current, in KRIS NELSON COMMUNITY-BASED RESEARCH PROGRAM 471 (Univ. of Minn. Digit. Conservancy ed., 2015), https://hdl.handle.net/
11299/178547; see also Ehsan Alam, Before it Was Cut in Half by I-94, St. Paul’s Rondo was a
Thriving African-American Cultural Center, MINNPOST, June 19, 2017; EVELYN FAIRBANKS,
DAYS OF RONDO (Minnesota Historical Society Press, ed., 1990); KENNETH C. FOXWORTH, THE
URBAN RENEWAL DEVASTATION OF THE RONDO COMMUNITY (Mankato State Univ., ed., 1991).
On Minnesota Black History, see generally WILLIAM D. GREEN, DEGREES OF FREEDOM: THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN MINNESOTA, 1865–1912 (2015); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN
SLAVERY: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1997); DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE
CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012).
4. On Minneapolis, see Ernest Lloyd, How Routing an Interstate Highway through South
Minneapolis Disrupted an African-American Community (May 18, 2013) (Dissertation, Hamline
University). On housing segregation, see generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A
FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (1st ed., 2017).
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national income for white households comes in at $84,500 a year compared
to just $38,000 a year for Black households.5
At the national level, many white Americans persist in believing that
the abolition of slavery accomplished through the Civil War and Reconstruction was sufficient to guarantee African Americans absolute equality
under the law. In reality, during the roughly twelve-year period between the
end of the Civil War and the Hayes Tilden Compromise of 1877 effectively
ending Reconstruction, civil rights for African Americans remained bitterly
contested. Despite the passage of seven major pieces of legislation, including three constitutional amendments, none proved sufficient to check the
rising tide of discrimination and racist violence.6
Looming large in the present discourse over accountability in policing
is whether enough political will exists to sustain the dialogue and action
necessary to effect lasting change. Importantly, historical recovery can
bring clarity to the present situation and a longitudinal focus for the work
ahead. Civil rights and physical security for African Americans have often
been treated as something that could be accomplished with the stroke of
pen. Legislation is only the first step in the much broader process of true
reform. Only long-term engagement unfettered by artificial timelines and
expectations of a quick victory can address what took centuries to create.7
One of the many strains of resistance to the extension of civil rights,
even among some of its purported champions, centered on the duration of
Reconstruction. Throughout the Reconstruction Era, the idea of a return to
normality, in which African Americans might avail themselves of the normal channels of law unassisted by federal agencies and not enforced by
federal troops, was squarely out of tune with the stark reality of concerted
efforts to deny them equal protection of the law. Interestingly, this very
language taken directly from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment became
and remains the basis for many contemporary challenges to interventions
meant to protect African Americans from discrimination.
Unfortunately, measures adopted to secure simple justice for African
Americans have been perceived as unjustified special privileges or redress
for past injustices rather than basic features of citizenship and deterrents to
discriminatory action. This misperception fueled backlash against anti-discrimination laws such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, key tools in the fight against systemic racism.
5. For Minnesota income inequality statistics, see Greg Rosalsky, Minneapolis Ranks Near
the Bottom for Racial Equality, NPR (June 2, 2020), www.npr.org/sections/money/2020/06/02/
867195676/minneapolis-ranks-near-the-bottom-for-racial-equality.
6. On Reconstruction, see ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE:
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1982); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (1988); RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO,
FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO WOODROW WILSON (1965).
7. YOHURU WILLIAMS, RETHINKING THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT (2015).
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This viewpoint also developed in the aftermath of the Civil War; it was
most clearly articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883.8 Echoes of this claim continue to dominate contemporary discourse over efforts to ensure absolute equality before the law for
African Americans in key areas, such as the exercise of the elective
franchise. As an example of historical recovery, the history of the Civil
Rights Cases themselves demonstrate the connective tissue. They link efforts undertaken to end the First Reconstruction in the South and current
calls for a Third Reconstruction to finally achieve, regardless of race, the
promise of equal citizenship promised in the Fourteenth Amendment. By
examining the circumstances of one case tied to the Civil Rights Cases of
1883, we can see through the process of historical recovery the problematic
roots of the special privilege’s argument.
***
In 1908, Oklahoma police charged a young white man named Charles
Johnson with stealing thirty bushels of oats. Unable to secure a bondsman,
Johnson was set to remain in jail until a generous benefactor came to his
aid. Upon learning of his arrest, Bird Gee, who said he had known Johnson
since the prisoner’s youth, came forward to post the $500 bond. Aside from
the oddity of the theft, what made the story newsworthy was Johnson’s
benefactor, described by the newspaper as a “wealthy negro.”9
In fact, Bird Gee was one of the most prosperous and influential Black
citizens in Oklahoma City at the time. Born in Missouri around 1844, Gee
served in the Civil War. Like many African Americans after the war, he
migrated to Kansas. There in 1873, he unsuccessfully ran to become the
constable of Doniphan County. That same year, further conveying his commitment to civic engagement, he also served as secretary of the Colored
Farmer’s Club of Highland, Kansas.10 Gee, a talented entrepreneur, migrated to Oklahoma sometime in the late 1800s and succeeded as a realtor
and undertaker. While the newspaper hinted at Gee’s fortune and standing
in the community, it is unlikely that many of his white neighbors were
aware of the forces that drove him to relocate. Chances are, they did not

8. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
9. He Liked Oats, MUSKOGEE TIMES-DEMOCRAT, Feb. 28, 1908, at 5. On the life of Bird
Gee, see AMINA HASSAN, LOREN MILLER: CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY AND JOURNALIST (2015);
LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE NEGRO (1966).
10. See HASSAN, supra note 9; MILLER, supra note 9. On Black migration to Kansas after the
Civil War, see NELL IRVIN PAINTER, EXODUSTERS: BLACK MIGRATION TO KANSAS AFTER RECONSTRUCTION (1976).
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know of his role in one of the most notorious landmark Supreme Court
cases of the era, the Civil Rights Cases of 1883.11
Some thirty-three years before being highlighted for his success in
Oklahoma, in October of 1875, Gee was residing in Hiawatha, Kansas
where he registered as a guest at a local hotel. When the dinner bell rang
later that day, Gee joined his fellow boarders in the dining room to await
service. His presence clearly rankled one patron, who upon seeing Gee take
a seat, left the table to complain to the owner, David Stanley. Instead, he
encountered Stanley’s son, Murray. After listening to the complaint, Murray went to the dining room and, after a brief verbal exchange, forcibly
ejected Gee from his seat.12 Flustered and humiliated by this treatment, Gee
hastily gathered his belongings and found other accommodations.13
Prior to 1875, Gee enjoyed very little protection from this type of discriminatory behavior until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
which was destined to become the last of the great Reconstruction Era laws.
The law prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodation, including inns, public amusement venues, and restaurants. Cognizant of the
new directive, Gee filed a complaint with U.S. District Attorney George R.
Peck. After a brief investigation, Peck charged the father and son with violating the decree. On April 14, 1876, Murray Stanley alone was indicted by
a federal grand jury for refusing the privileges of an inn to a person of
color.14 He appealed the decision to the federal circuit court, arguing that
Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact a public accommodations
law. Unable to reach a decision, the circuit court sent the matter to the U.S.
Supreme Court.15
Predictably, the case caused quite a stir in the region. White people
opposed to the extension of civil rights to African Americans decried the
bill as a transgression on their civil rights—specifically, their freedom of
association. They further framed the bill as a mechanism to reward African
Americans for acts of discrimination that afforded them a special legal status denied to white people. “Now what do you think of that fearful civil
rights bill?” observed a Kansas editorial published in the Waterville Telegraph.16 “There is no doubt but that the negro will get judgement [sic] for

11. U.S. Civil War Pension Index, microformed on NAI No. T288, Roll 170 (National
Archives); Colored Farmer’s Club of Highland, THE KANSAS CHIEF, (Sol Miller, ed.) Sept. 25,
1873, at 3.
12. THE HOLTON RECORDER, (Beck & Shiner, ed.) Apr. 13, 1876, at 4; On Run for Constable,
THE KANSAS CHIEF, Mar. 27, 1873, at 2.
13. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); MILLER, supra note 9, at 3–4.
14. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4.
15. Id.
16. Various Items from the State Capitol, Waterville Telegraph, Apr. 14, 1876 at 2; White
Cloud Items, THE KANSAS CHIEF, Apr. 6, 1876 at 3.
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$1000. If the said parties would refuse to board a white man, he would just
have to stand it, like a little man.”17
Despite the editorialist’s effort to paint the law as a grant of special
privileges to the descendants of slaves, the law was clearly necessary to
ensure a baseline of equality for African Americans. In the aftermath of the
war, it addressed efforts undertaken to relegate Black people to secondclass citizenship. As Gee explained to Peck, he arrived at the dining room
first and simply desired to be treated with the same courtesy and respect as
other patrons. The humiliation he endured, including being forcibly ejected
from his seat, meant he paid first-class fare for second-class treatment.
Of course, Gee was not the only person of color to suffer such indignities. Such incidents became common after the Civil War, sparking several
legal challenges around the nation, including the 1867 case of The West
Chester & Philadelphia Railroad Company (WC & PRR) v. Mary Miles.18
Miles brought suit against the railroad company after her ejection for
refusing the conductor’s demand to move to the colored section. Presupposing future appeals to segregation based on a dubious claim of public safety,
the railroad asserted that it was “not unreasonable . . . to seat passengers so
as . . . to prevent contacts . . . arising from natural . . . repugnancies, which
are liable to breed disturbances by promiscuous sitting.”19 The court, however, decided in favor of Miles, noting that the carrier “could not compel
plaintiff to change her seat simply on account of her color.”20
Undaunted, WC & PRR appealed the lower court’s ruling to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which heard the case in April of 1867. Writing for
the majority, Republican Justice Daniel Agnew sided with the railroad.
While agreeing with the premise that a common carrier could not decline to
take a passenger based on skin color, he nevertheless agreed with the railroad that it was “not unreasonable to assign places . . . to passengers of each
color” if the accommodations were equally comfortable, safe, and convenient.21 To underscore his point, Agnew drew an analogy to the “ladies’
car,” which he proclaimed, “implies no loss of equal right on the part of the
excluded sex . . . or the use of separate cars to separate civilian passengers
from military transports.”22
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Agnew acknowledged, but chose
to overlook, a March 1867 state law that specifically forbade railroad com17. Various Items from the State Capitol, supra note 16, at 2.
18. On the Miles case, see MIA BAY, TRAVELING BLACK: A STORY OF RACE AND RESISTANCE (2021); MARK E. DIXON, THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF CHESTER COUNTY: LOST TALES FROM
THE DELAWARE & BRANDYWINE VALLEYS (2011). See also Ali Roseberry-Polier, Taking History
to the Streets with Preservation Activism, Hidden City Philadelphia, June 6, 2018, hiddencity
phila.org/2018/06/taking-history-to-the-streets-with-preservation-activism.
19. See West Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 209 (1867).
20. Id. at 210.
21. Id. at 211.
22. Id.
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panies from discriminating based on race. The law, prohibiting “any passenger railway company from excluding any race of people from its
passenger cars on account of color,” was first introduced by State Senator
Morrow B. Lowry in 1865.23 Agnew maintained that this law was not relevant because it passed after the incident involving Miles.
While the passage of the Lowry law made the Court’s decision moot,
the decision would later be cited by the U.S. Supreme Court as a key precedent in the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).24 Thus, like Gee’s
case, an action brought to address the use of racial discrimination later became one of many precedents used to justify the constitutionality of the
“separate but equal” doctrine.
Importantly, Agnew’s ruling demonstrated that the Republican Party,
often touted as the Party of Lincoln, was by no means uniform on the issue
of civil rights for African Americans. Speaking in support of the bill that
ultimately became the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in December of 1873, African American Republican Representative Joseph H. Rainey of South Carolina laid the issue squarely before his fellow legislators. “We, sirs,” he
observed, “would not ask of this Congress as a people that they should
legislate for us specifically as a class if we could only have those rights
which this bill is designed to give us accorded us without this enactment.”25
Cautioning his colleagues not to overlook the pervasiveness of segregation,
Rainey further explained:
We do not ask the passage of any law forcing us upon anybody
who does not want to receive us. But we do want a law enacted
that we may be recognized like other men in the country. Why is
it that colored members of Congress cannot enjoy the same immunities that are accorded to white members? Why cannot we
stop at hotels here without meeting objection? Why cannot we go
into restaurants without being insulted? We are here enacting
laws for the country and casting votes upon important questions;
we have been sent here by the suffrages of the people, and why
cannot we enjoy the same benefits that are accorded to our white
colleagues on this floor?26
“I say to you, gentlemen . . .” he maintained, “that the negro will never rest
until he gets his rights.” He continued, “We ask them because we know it is
proper, not because we want to deprive any other class of the rights and
immunities they enjoy, because they are granted to us by the law of the
land.”27
23. Dixon, supra note 18, at 71.
24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
25. CONG. GLOBE, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. 343–44 (1874) (Statement of Rep. Joseph Rainey
addressing the Civil Rights Bill of 1875 on December 19, 1873).
26. Id.
27. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\18-1\UST109.txt

178

unknown

Seq: 8

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

13-APR-22

18:31

[Vol. 18:1

Although the Senate ultimately passed the bill by a vote of thirty-eight to
twenty-six on February 27, 1875, and paved the way for it to become law
on March 1, Stanley’s challenge expressed many of the concerns that had
been voiced in opposition to its adoption. By the time the Supreme Court
was set to rule on Stanley’s and four other public accommodations cases
under the banner of the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, African American civil
rights, at least regarding access to places of public accommodation, remained largely in limbo. African Americans were keenly aware of the import of the coming decision. The nearly six-year hiatus between when many
of the plaintiffs filed suit and the decision was already a disappointment.
This dissatisfaction was nothing in comparison to the disillusionment that
followed the publication of the Court’s opinion.
Writing for the eight-person majority, Justice Joseph Bradley held that
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional on the grounds that it
exceeded the scope of the “equal protection” clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.28 The Court held it applied only to actions taken by state actors and not private individuals.29
In an oft-quoted passage echoing the spirit of the challenge to the law
raised in the Kansas editorial, Justice Bradley questioned not only the constitutionality of the law but the efficacy of additional civil rights legislation.
“When a man has emerged from slavery,” Bradley maintained,
and, by the aid of beneficent legislation, has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen
and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his
rights as a citizen or a man are to be protected in the ordinary
modes by which other men’s rights are protected.30
Justice Bradley’s words mocked the lived experience of African Americans in this period, including the fear and uncertainty that dogged ordinary
tasks such as renting a room or taking the trolley. As early as 1866, in a
speech at the Eleventh National Women’s Rights Convention, Frances Ellen Watkins Harper revealed how “I, as a colored woman, have had in this
country an education which has made me feel as if I were in the situation of
Ishmael, my hand against every man, and every man’s hand against me.”31
She offered an example, “Let me go tomorrow morning and take my seat in
one of your street cars[.] I do not know that they will do it in New York, but

28. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25.
29. Id. at 24–25.
30. Id. at 25; see also LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, INHERENTLY UNEQUAL: THE BETRAYAL OF
EQUAL RIGHTS BY THE SUPREME COURT, 1865–1903 (2011).
31. See Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, Address at Eleventh National Women’s Rights Convention: We Are All Bound Up Together (May 1, 1866).
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they will in Philadelphia — and the conductor will put up his hand and stop
the car rather than let me ride.”32
Harper underscored the compounding impact of the harm. As she told
those gathered in 1866, “Today I am puzzled where to make my home. I
would like to make it in Philadelphia, near my own friends and relations.
But if I want to ride in the streets of Philadelphia, they send me to ride on
the platform with the driver.”33
Rather than providing certainty for African Americans on this front,
the Court’s ruling had the opposite effect. It removed the only federal law
aimed at prohibiting racial discrimination by private individuals and businesses, opening the door for increased discrimination.
While African Americans were clearly disappointed, the Court’s decision was met with stunned approval of the law’s detractors and of those
committed to the maintenance of white supremacy. “The opinion is a surprise to the country,” observed an editorial in the Hiawatha Kansas Brown
County Word, “but it is good law, it will stand, and it agrees with the
prejudices of almost every white man, woman and child in the United
States.”34 An editorial in the Natchez Weekly Democrat came to a similar
conclusion. “The civil rights bill was, conceived in a spirit of hatred during
a period of national madness. The return of good feeling has brought about
its nullification and we think the whole country feels that a useless load has
been lifted from Its [sic] shoulders that was grievous to every section of the
country.”35 The Kansas City Chief arrived at a similar conclusion. “This
decision will have a bad effect, in some respects, and in others a salutary
one,” the newspaper observed in an article aptly entitled, “Civil Rights Law
Dead.”36 “The ones to suffer,” the newspaper concluded, “will be chiefly
the upstarts, who persisted in forcing themselves among people who could
not appreciate them, simply because they thought the law would uphold
them. Those colored people who were content to keep with their own class,
will never feel the difference.”37
The missed opportunity for the law to function as a deterrent to future
discriminatory action was highlighted by the response to the ruling in the
District of Columbia. As a federal jurisdiction, it would remain enforceable
there. An editorial in the Lincoln Bee observed, “There are several suits
pending in the District, and the reference made to these in Justice Bradley’s
opinion caused some consternation among hotel and restaurant men, who
imagine it will operate disastrously to them. The strong intimation that the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
The Civil Rights Cases, BROWN COUNTY WORLD, Oct. 25, 1883, at 2.
THE WEEKLY DEMOCRAT, Oct. 24, 1883, at 4.
Civil Rights Law Dead, THE KANSAS CHIEF, Oct. 18, 1883, at 2.
Id.
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law of Congress is operative in the District of Columbia while not deciding
the question pending as to the District is construed as authoritative.”38
African Americans saw the outcome very differently. Even before the
case was decided, they could not always be sure of the law’s enforcement,
especially in the states of the former Confederacy. Activists were keenly
aware of the impact of the court’s decision, framing it as another blow to
absolute equality before the law. African American civil rights activists
Frederick Douglass and A.M.E. Bishop Henry McNeil Turner were among
the most vocal critics. Turner saw in the framework of Justice Bradley’s
opinion what he termed, “those famous FIVE DEATH DEALING DECISIONS” as the Court’s final capitulation to white supremacy.39
Turner did not mince words in affixing blame for the Court’s motivation, despite its political affiliation with the Party of Lincoln, to support
white supremacy. “It is not hinted that this Republican Supreme Court had
caused it to be noised abroad what their ‘finding’ would be if the ‘law’ was
inquired into,” Turner observed.40 “The Court, it is said,” he continued,
could see, and only see, Negroes in Kansas and Missouri intermingling with white persons, in hotels and inns; Negroes, in California and New York, associating, on equal terms, with
Caucasians in theatres; and Negroes in the presence of those free
from the taint of African blood, in the parlor-cars of Tennessee.
These sights completely blinded the eyes of the, at other times,
learned Judges, and one of their number, not too full of indignation for utterance, proclaimed aloud, these things may not be;
these pictures shall not in future be produced; the law is unconstitutional; and all of the other members, save one, said, Amen!41
Turner singled out for praise Justice John Marshall Harlan whose singular dissent from the majority opinion reverberates powerfully in our contemporary moment. Justice Harlan alone seemed to recognize that only
positive action, in the form of affirmative legislation, could ensure for African Americans a fair chance at real equality—free from discriminatory
practices. He also recognized the unique historical circumstances that informed the necessity of such laws. “The one underlying purpose of congressional legislation,” Justice Harlan stated, “has been to enable the black race
to take the rank of mere citizens.”42 Furthermore, he argued, “The difficulty
has been to compel a recognition of their legal right to take that rank, and to
secure the enjoyment of privileges belonging, under the law, to them as a
38. LINCOLN BEACON, Oct. 25, 1883, at 2.
39. HENRY MCNEAL TURNER, CIVIL RIGHTS. THE OUTRAGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES UPON THE BLACK MAN. REVIEWED IN A REPLY TO THE NEW YORK “VOICE,” THE
GREAT TEMPERANCE PAPER OF THE UNITED STATES, 3 (1889) microformed on Davis Libr., Univ.
of N.C. at Chapel Hill (2000), http://docsouth.unc.edu/church/turnercivil/menu.html.
40. Id. at 6–7.
41. Id. at 7.
42. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 61 (1883).
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component part of the people for whose welfare and happiness government
is ordained.”43 In a moment of historical recovery, Justice Harlan maintained, “At every step in this direction, the nation has been confronted with
class tyranny, which a contemporary English historian says is, of all tyrannies, the most intolerable, ‘for it is ubiquitous in its operation, and weighs,
perhaps, most heavily on those whose obscurity or distance would withdraw
them from the notice of a single despot.’”44
Contemplating both the immediate and long-term implications of the
Court’s decision, Justice Harlan somberly added,
To-day it is the colored race, which is denied, by corporations and
individuals wielding public authority, rights fundamental in their
freedom and citizenship. At some future time, it may be some
other race that will fall under the ban. If the constitutional amendments be enforced, according to the intent with which, as I conceive, they were adopted, there cannot be, in this republic, any
class of human beings in practical subjection to another class,
with power in the latter to dole out to the former just such privileges as they may choose to grant. The supreme law of the land
has decreed that no authority shall be exercised in this country
upon the basis of discrimination, in respect of civil rights, against
freemen and citizens because of their race, color, or previous condition of servitude. To that decree—for the due enforcement of
which, by appropriate legislation, congress has been invested with
express power—everyone must bow, whatever may have been, or
whatever now are, his individual views as to the wisdom or policy, either of the recent changes in the fundamental law, or of the
legislation which has been enacted to give them effect.45
Justice Harlan’s forecast came to pass just thirteen years later with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).46 The doctrine of
“separate but equal” effectively created two tiers of citizenship. With
Plessy, the class of people Justice Bradley previously contended were becoming “the special favorites of the law” were relegated to the back of the
bus, the side door of the theatre, and other prescribed spaces marked by the
legal designation “Colored.”47 Justice Bradley likened the necessity for additional legislation to protect African Americans from additional acts of discrimination to “running the slavery argument into the ground,”48 but no
aspect of American life or culture, from lunch counters to cemeteries, subsequently escaped the tentacles of Jim Crow segregation.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 62.
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 62.
Id. at 24.
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Justice Harlan, of course, also offered a spirited dissent from the majority in Plessy. “Our constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. . . . The arbitrary separation of citizens on the
basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude
wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law
established by the Constitution.”49
Justice Harlan did not mean “color blindness” in the same way it is
sometimes invoked today to challenge race-specific legislation, but rather to
highlight the necessity of laws to protect African Americans and other minorities from the tyranny of white supremacy. The language of the Constitution itself did not acknowledge such racial classifications. Moreover,
Justice Harlan understood for the larger principles upon it was framed to
have real meaning, legislators should check the impulse toward segregation
and other forms of discriminatory action that undermined the principle of
citizenship and the equal protection of the law. In the parlance of today,
Justice Harlan understood it would not suffice for the law simply to be not
racist, but instead it must be antiracist, with a range of actions to remediate,
correct, and prevent acts of discrimination.
Justice Harlan’s opinion was the minority view. In the decades following the Court’s ruling in Plessy, African American activists once again set
their sights on challenging the roots of inequality within the law. In the two
decades after the end of World War II, coupled with the rise of nonviolent
direct action, these efforts bore fruit in successful legal challenges to state
sanctioned segregation in housing, higher education, and transportation. In
tandem, both trajectories undermined the precedent established in Plessy
that culminated in the ultimate repudiation of the “separate but equal” doctrine in the Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.50
Even with Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion becoming the majority
view, the Second Reconstruction faced the same conundrum that plagued
the first. As Michael Klarman documented, the backlash against Brown v.
Board of Education fueled massive resistance in the South.51 The passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 faced
similar opposition. As in 1875, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 inspired fear
and was met with fierce opposition by those who viewed steps toward affirmative rights for African Americans as a grant of special privileges. The
law served as a hallmark of the Second Reconstruction, as the civil rights
movement came to be known, but was dogged by the reverberations of the
Court’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883. Instead of being viewed
as a remedy for past historical injustices that made such corrections neces49. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 559, 562.
50. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J.
AM. HIST., 81–118, n.1 (1994); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
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sary, opposition to affirmative action framed it as a grant of special privileges to African Americans, creating unfair advantages.
In addition, pressure continued to sunset so-called entitlement programs based on similar reasoning from the Reconstruction Era. Christopher
Edley Jr. and Gene B. Sperling conceptualized the problem in a June 1989
editorial in The Washington Post, aptly titled, “Have We Really ‘Done
Enough’ for Civil Rights?”
The very success of widespread racial exclusion — lasting until
just one generation ago — left everyone and no one responsible at
the same time. With overt discrimination mostly out of the picture, employers could blame an absence of black workers on educational disadvantage; educators could shrug and point to
housing; housing officials and real estate brokers could point to
low incomes; and so on. It is fatuous to pretend that the debilitating effects of centuries of servitude — persisting in the sharecropper culture of the South and the jampacked ghettos of the North
well into the post-World War II period — can be reversed in a
brief period of lukewarm tolerance. Sensible remedies to our
great national conundrum are not easy to come by, but a country
that cares about its integrity must try. The first step in reaffirming
our commitment to the ideals of racial justice is to make another
attempt at an honest discussion of our differences on how to
achieve it.52
Edley and Sperling determined that the three ingredients “needed to
renew this generation’s effort at Reconstruction [were]: reaffirmation, pragmatism and another way of doing the business of civil rights.”53 Without
such a commitment in our present moment, we remain susceptible to replicating the mistakes of the past. Justice Harlan’s dissent, as well as Bishop
Turner’s critique, resonate as powerfully today as they did in 1883 and with
the same sense of urgency. Efforts to restrict African American voting
rights, along with an unwillingness to address issues of discriminatory practices in housing, education, employment, and criminal justice, form the crux
of the problem.
More than a century ago W.E.B. Du Bois wrote that, “The problem of
the twentieth century is the problem of the color line; the relation of the
darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the
islands of the sea.”54 In 2021, the problem of the twenty-first century remains the problem of the color line, reinforced by legacies of injustice that
assume equality while reinforcing structures that deny it. The backlash
52. Christopher Edley & Gene Sperling, Have We Really ‘Done Enough’ for Civil Rights?,
WASH. POST (June 25, 1989), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1989/06/25/
have-we-really-done-enough-for-civil-rights/1b3fc305-be26-42bd-90c7-a726bdf924b6.
53. Id.
54. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND DRAWINGS 8 (A.C. McClurg
& Co., 2d ed. 1903).
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against efforts to ensure equality in policing and voting rights in our time
demonstrate the continued prescient value of Justice Harlan’s dissents in
both the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 and Plessy v. Ferguson. In a nation
where racial inequality runs rampant, the only pathway “to enable the black
race to take the rank of mere citizens”55 must involve a concerted effort at
dismantling those structures, policies, practices, and procedures that continue to perpetuate inequality. We must be unencumbered by artificial timelines and superficial metrics. Then, and only then, will we be able to
conquer racial inequality consistent with the ideological underpinnings of
our governing documents.
After the Supreme Court decided the Civil Rights Cases, and despite
his successful business ventures in the state, Bird Gee eventually left Kansas. As his grandnephew later recalled, “Uncle Bird was furious and announced he was going to Indian Territory to spend the rest of his life among
what he called ‘the heathens.’”56 Like countless other African Americans,
he later settled in Oklahoma.57 In the first decade of the twentieth century,
newspaper accounts capture bits of his life there, such as posting bail for
Charles Johnson. He continued to enjoy success as a businessman, despite
the encroaching Jim Crow tentacles of not only individual acts of prejudice
and discrimination but state-sanctioned segregation in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. In the first few years of
the twentieth century, he continued to amass wealth and influence through
his ownership of multiple properties, earning designation as one of the
wealthiest men in the region. However, when Oklahoma became the fortysixth state admitted to the Union in November of 1907, he quickly found
himself a target, the victim of a campaign of harassment by local officials
bent on introducing segregation to the former “Indian” territory. Gee weathered the legal assaults on his integrity and assets, including unjust imprisonment for a short period in 1912 for allegedly falsely representing his
property in a bond case—carrying a prison term of ten years. He did so with
the same dignity, grace, and commitment to fight he exhibited in Kansas.58
Gee’s experience might best be summed up by a letter he submitted to
the editor of the Kansas City Chief from the state of New York, where he
was visiting in September of 1876. “Please permit me space in your columns,” he began, “to give to the many readers of the Chief a few thoughts
on the condition of Kansas and the Eastern States,” and the question
“Where will you go to better yourselves?”59 While acknowledging menaces
to the harvest such as drought and grasshoppers in Kansas, Gee noted that
55.
56.
Racism,
57.
58.
59.

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 61 (1883).
For quote attributed to Bird Gee, see Loren Miller, How Supreme Court Overcame its
EBONY MAGAZINE, 57 (Mar. 1, 1966).
Id.; MILLER, supra note 19.
Abstract of Judgment, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 2, 1912, at 6.
Bird Gee, From New York, THE KANSAS CHIEF, Sept. 14, 1876, at 2.
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things were scarcely better in the East. “The manufactories are all suspending,” he grimly observed:
thousands of men are out of employment walking the streets who
are dependent on labor for support. Starvation is staring them in
the face. The great cry with them is, they are living under the
Republican administration, and want a change. They all want
change [;] when they feel round, they have none.60
Gee’s advice to his fellow Kansans was simple. “Improve your lands
in Kansas and stick to it.”61 To further emphasize his point, Gee turned his
attention to politics, recounting a troubling speech given by a New York
Democrat a few days prior. Gee remarked, “He said this is and should be a
white man’s government, for the white men and their posterity.”62 Pointedly, he inserted, “It is well to note such expressions made by a party in
anticipation of being placed in power.”63 In addition to general concerns
about work and the economy African Americans shared with their fellow
citizens, Gee highlighted the unique anxieties African Americans faced
with regard to the unchecked resurgence of an ascendent white supremacy
and the accompanying racial terror upon which it always depended for
enforcement.
The Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases further discounted the
value of Black lives regardless of their contribution to the larger society.
This was true not only of Gee, but of many of his neighbors and colleagues
that included the notable Black scientist and inventor George Washington
Carver. In March of 1888, both men, along with several other prominent
Black families, “as an evidence of the determination of our people to live
and make homes here,” planted more than 1600 ornamental trees.64 That
same month, Carver testified on Gee’s behalf regarding the latter’s claim to
a homestead exemption. Finding Carver, “a somewhat remarkable character” by “reason of his color, and opportunities,” the local Ness County News
turned an article regarding his testimony into a mini biography.65 After extolling Carver’s many accomplishments and finding him “a pleasant and
intelligent man to talk with,” the editor pointed out the stark reality of life in
Jim Crow America.66 He concluded “were it not for his dusky skin—no
fault of his—he might occupy a different sphere, to which his abilities
would otherwise entitle him.”67
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Beeler Buglings, NESS CITY TIMES, Mar. 1, 1888, at 4.
Twenty-Five Years Ago, NESS COUNTY NEWS, Mar. 29, 1913, at 1.
Id.
Id.; see also, Notice for Publication No 512, NESS CITY SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 1888, at 8;
MARK D. HERSEY, MY WORK IS THAT OF CONSERVATION: AN ENVIRONMENTAL BIOGRAPHY OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER 19 (2011).
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Why and how is this germane to the proposed George Floyd Justice in
Policing Act? It is an important step in healing the wounds and addressing
the discriminatory action that has been, as Al Sharpton put it, “the story of
black folks in America.”68 It is a story that inextricably connects generations in a shared struggle to make the promises of American democracy real
against the backdrop of its foundations in white supremacy. Most of what
we know about Bird Gee, for example, was recorded by his grandnephew.
He was the distinguished jurist and civil rights attorney Loren Miller. Along
with Thurgood Marshall, he became one of the primary architects of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP)
campaign to invalidate racially restrictive covenants and end housing segregation in the 1940s. Such cross-generational activism is not uncommon and
also points to a larger challenge.
We must acknowledge and accept that a problem crafted and reinforced for centuries cannot be wiped out in a generation. No more compelling example of that exists than the current battle over voting rights in states
like Ohio, Florida, and Georgia. Those rights were jeopardized by the Supreme Court’s skewering of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Shelby
County v. Holder69 in 2013. It was Congressman John Lewis who reminded
us of the importance of history and the need for historical recovery in that
moment. “We may not have people being beaten today,” he observed,
maybe they’re not being denied the right to participate, to register
to vote, they’re not being chased by police dogs or trampled by
horses. But in the 11 states of the old Confederacy and even in
some of the states outside of the South, there has been a systematic, deliberate attempt to take us back to another period.70
Lewis implored, “My message to the members of the United States
Supreme Court is remember, don’t forget our recent history. Walk in our
shoes. Come and walk in our shoes.”71
Congressman Lewis, in his final letter to the American people published posthumously in July of 2020, pointed to history as an important
foundation for the work ahead. Reflecting on his own journey, Lewis punctuated the issue of intergenerational trauma as a spark for activism. As he
wrote, “Emmett Till was my George Floyd. He was my Rayshard Brooks,
Sandra Bland, and Breonna Taylor.”72 Far from echoing the problematic
adage that history repeats itself, Lewis offered a powerful lesson in
agency—reminding us that his own life, like the lives of Bird Gee, Loren
68. Sharpton, supra note 2; Saldivia, supra note 2.
69. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
70. Amy Goodman, Opinion, Big Wins, Loss for Civil Rights, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (June 28,
2013), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2013/jun/28/big-wins-loss-for-civil-rights.
71. Id.
72. John Lewis, Opinion, Together, You Can Redeem the Soul of Our Nation, N.Y. TIMES
(July 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/30/opinion/john-lewis-civil-rightsamerica.html.
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Miller, and countless other known and unknown women and men, was a
testament to it.
As Lewis put it, “Democracy is not a state. It is an act, and each generation must do its part to help build what we called the Beloved Community,
a nation and world society at peace with itself.”73 The work of historical
recovery remains essential to that process.

73. Id.

